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Jennifer Chandler*

Reading the Judicial Mind: Predicting
the Courts' Reaction to the Use of
Neuroscientific Evidence for Lie Detection

How will the courts react to the emerging technology of detecting deception using
neuroscientific methods such as neuro-imaging? The sociological theory of the
autonomy of technology suggests that if neuroscientific techniques come to be
seen as reliable for this purpose, other objections will soon be abandoned. The
history of the judicial reaction to DNA evidence illustrates this pattern. As DNA
evidence came to be seen as highly reliable, the courts rapidly abandoned their
concerns that juries would be overwhelmed by the "mystique of science" and that
the justice system would be "dehumanized." The legal justifications for rejecting
polygraph evidence are explored in order to illustrate that the judicial resistance
to lie detection technologies, including neuro-imaging, can be expected to follow
a similar pattern. The author argues that technologies that are widely accepted
as reliable cannot be permitted to remain outside the justice system to deliver
their own verdicts that are incompatible with those of the courts. The continued
legitimacy of the justice system cannot tolerate this. The rules of evidence and,
in particular, the constitutional right to make full answer and defense are the legal
mechanisms by which this accommodation would take place.
Comment les tribunaux reagiront-ils face &la technologie 6mergente qui permet
de ddtecter la supercherie J l'aide de mdthodes neuroscientifiques comme la
neuro-imagerie? La thdorie sociologique d'autonomie de la technologie veut que
si des techniques neuroscientifiques en viennent 6 6tre consid6r6es comme 6tant
fiables 6 cette fin, d'autres objections seront aussi, .6ventuellement, laiss6es de
cit6. L'expbrience de la rdaction du pouvoir judiciaire aux preuves provenant de
I'analyse de lADN illustre bien ce cheminement A mesure que la fiabilitd de Ia
preuve provenant de I'analyse de l'ADN s'avdrait, les tribunaux ont mis de cat6
l'inqui6tude que les jurds seraient d6passds par le c6td mystdrieux de la science
et que le systbme de justice serait dishumanis6. Les motifs d'ordre juridique
pour refuser la preuve polygraphique sont examin6s pour expliquer que Ion peut
s'attendre & ce que la r6sistance du pouvoir judiciaire face aux technologies
de d6tection des mensonges, dont la neuro-imagerie, suive le mame parcours.
L'auteur plaide que les technologies dont la fiabilit6 est largement accept6e ne
doivent pas rester 6trangaresau systame de justice parce qu'elles rendent des
verdicts incompatibles avec ceux des tribunaux. La 14gitimit6 du syst~me dejustice
ne saurait le toldrer Les rbgles de preuve, en particulier le droit constitutionnel &
une defense pleine et entibre, sont les mdcanismes juridiques par lesquels cet
accommodement serait accord6.

Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. Many thanks to the anonymous peer
reviewer for an extremely helpful review, and to Jocelyn Downie for suggestions and support for my
work on neuroscience and the law.
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Introduction
The objective of this paper is to examine how the courts might react to
the emerging neuroscientific techniques for detecting deception. The
application of neuroscience to lie detection is based on the observation that
deception may be associated with particular patterns of brain activity that
are manifested in local changes in blood oxygenation or with characteristic
forms of electrical activity in the brain.
Lie detection is an important component of the judicial function in a
trial, since the trier of fact (the jury, or the judge where it is a judge-alone
trial) must ascertain what happened in the dispute by assessing evidence
including the live testimony of witnesses. Over the years, courts have
had to decide how to handle other lie detection technologies such as the
polygraph (lie detector) test, or voice stress analysis. They have also had
to decide when to accept expert evidence that is relevant to credibility
such as the evidence of child psychologists about why children may recant
allegations of abuse. While the courts have, on occasion, been willing
to accept expert psychological evidence, they have generally rejected
technologies such as the polygraph, which purports to detect deception
directly by measuring physiological reactions.
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The underlying reasons for the rejection of polygraph evidence by
Canadian and American courts are essentially two-fold. In some cases,
the evidence is said to be unreliable.' Second, the evidence is also
sometimes said to be unnecessary and dangerous. The courts state that
the evidence is unnecessary because human beings are eminently capable
of assessing credibility, and it is dangerous because it might cause the
trier of fact to abdicate the responsibility of determining credibility and
merely to defer to the expert polygraph examiner. Sometimes this second
objection is framed in emotionally laden language, such as that the use
of the technological evidence would.dehumanize the justice system and
usurp the quintessentially human function of assessing credibility.
The belief that lie detection technologies are unnecessary is based
on a presumption that human triers of fact are competent to perform this
function unaided. In fact, the legal system is curiously ambivalent on
this point. The courts often state that it is "axiomatic" that humans can
and should perform the finction of determining credibility. Furthermore,
an appellate court is supposed to defer to a trial court's findings of fact
because of the great advantage presumably held by the trial court in being
able to observe witness demeanour while the appellate court has only dead
transcripts to read. All of this suggests that the legal system is confident
in the human ability to assess credibility. At the same time, however, the
recommended instructions to juries warn jurors of the potential dangers of
relying too heavily on demeanour to make determinations about credibility.
The experimental evidence is quite consistent in suggesting that human
beings on average do not do much better than chance in assessing credibility
based on demeanour alone.2 It is difficult to know whether this result
can be generalized to the trial where other forms of information beyond
demeanour are available to assist in assessing credibility. Nonetheless,
there seem to be quite good reasons to be concerned with the quality of a
trial court's credibility assessment procedures, particularly where there is
little evidence other than demeanour available for assessing credibility.
In addition to the belief that lie detection technology is unnecessary
because humans can assess credibility, the courts also defend what is
1. The term "reliable" is used throughout in the sense in which it is used in the legal context-i.e.,
reliable evidence is evidence that is worthy of being relied upon because it is sufficiently likely to
correctly suggest the proposition for which it is put forward. In other contexts, "reliable" is sometimes
meant to indicate that the same results can be expected from multiple measurements whether or not
they are in fact accurate. This other meaning is not used in this paper.
2.
See, e.g., Paul Ekman, Maureen O'Sullivan & Mark G. Frank, "A Few Can Catch a Liar" (1999)
10 Psych. Sci. 263 [Ekman, O'Sullivan & Frank]; Paul Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan, "Who Can
Catch a Liar?" (1991) 46 Am. Psych. 913 [Ekman & O'Sullivan]; Aldert Vrij et al., "Detecting lies in
young children, adolescents and adults" (2006) 20 Applied Cognitive Psychology 1225 [Vrij et al.].
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sometimes called the "province" of the trier of fact. In other words, the
courts regard credibility determination as falling within the role or function
of the trier of fact, and defend it against "usurpation" by outside experts.
They also express concern with the dehumanization of the justice system.
Similar objections were raised in the early days of the use of DNA evidence
for identification purposes.' However, within a few years the courts had
reversed position and embraced DNA evidence. Can we learn anything
about the future of lie detection technologies in the courts from this history
given that both lie detection and DNA technologies faced similar objections
related to the usurpation of the role of the trier of fact? There are some
important differences between the two of course. DNA evidence became
widely-accepted as reliable while lie detection technologies have not yet
been accepted as such. Further, DNA evidence is used for identification
rather than lie detection, and courts are accustomed to seeking assistance
with identification whereas the court has only rarely accepted third party
help with credibility assessment. As a result, the sense that the technology
is usurping the function of the trier of fact is not as acute in the context of
identification technologies as for lie detection technologies.
Nevertheless, the history of DNA evidence, which was initially
resisted on similat grounds as are raised against the polygraph (and are
likely to be raised against neuroscientific lie detection), suggests that
once a technology can be clearly demonstrated to be reliable, it will be
accepted notwithstanding competing concerns about dehumanization or
usurpation of the human functions in a trial. This is consistent with the
theory of autonomous technology, which is derived from the sociological,
historical and philosophical studies of technology. This theory suggests
that technology tends to resist or escape deliberate human control, instead
re-shaping social values and behaviour to ensure the integration of the
technology into the culture.
In previous work, I have suggested that there are patterns in our legal
rules and procedures that are consistent with the theory of autonomous
technology.' In particular, legal rules and methods tend to re-frame
disputes in a way that assists in societal adaptation to, and incorporation
of, novel technologies that are in dispute. This paper builds on this
work, suggesting that the courts too are not immune to technological
encroachment on their functions and procedures despite initial resistance.
See, R. v. Bourguignon, [1991] O.J. No. 2670 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff'd (1996) 118 C.C.C. (3d) 43
3.
(Ont. C.A.) [Bourguignon].
Jennifer Chandler, "The Autonomy of Technology: Do courts control technology or do they
4.
just legitimize its social acceptance?" (2007) 27 Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 339
[Chandler].
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I suggest that the technological values of reliability and efficacy offer
a durable base upon which a court may refuse to adopt neuroscientific
lie detection, while the concerns about the dehumanization of the justice
system and the usurpation of human roles will, it is predicted, be forgotten
if neuroscientific lie detection is demonstrated to be highly reliable. The
constitutional protection of the right to make full answer and defence to
criminal charges, as well as the need to preserve the legitimacy of the
justice system, will make it necessary to adopt a reliable lie detection
technology particularly where the existing "human" method is shown to
be deficient. Some may feel that this outcome is fine, and that we should
adopt reliable technologies for lie detection if and when they develop.
I do not address the desirability of this outcome, but instead focus on
the way in which traditional values and commitments (such as the firm
attachment to the idea that humans should assess credibility in the trial
context) may give way to technological developments.
The paper will proceed as follows. Part I will describe the theory
of autonomous technology, and its application to predicting the judicial
reaction to neuroscientific lie detection. Part II will briefly outline the
history and current status of lie detection technologies, including the
emerging neuroscientific techniques. Part III explores the current nontechnological approach to lie detection in the courts and the legal system's
faith in the human ability to detect deception. Part IV reviews the legal
rules that, it is argued, will apply if an accused person seeks to support
his or her credibility using neuroscientific techniques. This last Part also
concludes that the history of judicial reactions to other novel forms of
scientific evidence suggest that the courts will accept neuroscientific lie
detection evidence if and when it is shown to be reliable, notwithstanding
concerns about the erosion of the traditional functions of the courts.
I. The autonomy of technology
Technology is a central feature of human ideology and activity, and
it is closely tied to the characteristics of our existence in the world as
well as the consequences of our existence for the world. Technology is
understood here to refer to the diverse collection of tools, techniques
and systems (both material and non-material) used by human beings to
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achieve particular goals.' One of the central questions in the sociological
study of technology has to do with the extent to which technology
shapes societies, as well as human action and perception.6 Technological
determinism holds that technology is the central force in human history,
determining the structure of the rest of society and culture.' In other words,
"as technology develops and changes, the institutions in the rest of society
change, as does the art and religion of the society."' Soft and hard variants
of technological determinism leave more or less room for independent
(i.e., non-technologically determined) social and cultural influences on the
course of technological change.9
The thesis of the autonomy of technology is a related claim that
technology seems somehow to resist or escape human control.10 This is a
curious idea, given that human beings appear freely to use or reject particular
technologies. Nonetheless, there are various ways in which, as humans
and societies, we may come to be obliged to adopt a given technology.
Technologies may change the human environment in ways that necessitate
their continued use. For example, the development of technologies such
as motorized transportation or the Internet have led to patterns of urban
development and culture that make the use of these technologies nearly
essential for full participation in our society. The adoption of technologies
may also be driven by human competition, as is illustrated by the history
of warfare and the "arms race." The effect of the competitive pressure
is also illustrated by the search for advantage in sport, both in terms of
athletic equipment and pharmaceutical enhancement, and it also underlies
concerns that the uptake of other human enhancement technologies is
inevitable. At a more subtle level, technologies may also shift human
5.
This is an admittedly broad definition. The selection of a definition for a particular inquiry must
navigate between the poles of excessive narrowness and excessive breadth. Scholars involved in the
study of technology as a phenomenon have struggled with a definition that usefully encapsulates the
key features of technology without expanding to encompass virtually all human activity. In the end,
I agree with writers such as Ellul and Winner that a real understanding of technological behaviour
and activity requires a definition of technology that is broader than the various material tools humans
have used from time to time, and also encompasses goal-oriented techniques and systems as well. See
Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in PoliticalThought
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1977) [Winner].
6.
Carl Mitcham & Katinka Waelbers, "Technology and Ethics: Overview" in Jan-Kyrre Olen,
Stig Andur Pedersen & Vincent F. Hendricks, eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology
(Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 367 at 371.
7. . Merritt Roe Smith, "Technological Determinism in American Culture" in Merritt Roe Smith
& Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2004) at 2 [Smith]; Val Dusek, PhilosophyofTechnology: An Introduction
(Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006) at 84 [Dusek].
Dusek, ibid.at 84.
8.
Smith, supra note 7 at 2.
9.
10. Winner, supra note 5 at 15; Dusek, supranote 7 at 84.
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values and culture in a process that Winner calls "reverse adaptation.""
In this process, human ends are adjusted to match technologies. Winner
offers the example of techniques of measurement and evaluation which,
rather than being "neutral, uninvolved sensing devices" instead may refashion the goals of the measured activity.12 For example, standardized
mass testing in education re-orients education toward the achievement
of those kinds of skills that are readily testable through multiple-choice
testing and away from skills, such as creative writing, that are less easily
tested in this way.'
The idea of the autonomy of technology is familiar within the
philosophy and sociology of technology, but it has been little explored in
the legal context.14 Yet, as one of the key mechanisms by which human
control of technology might take place, the law is an important focus for
the exploration of how and whether we are free to make choices about the
adoption of novel technologies. The assumption that our laws and legal
institutions are conduits for the expression of freely-chosen collective
decisions to promote, regulate or ban certain technologies may be wrong.
If the thesis of autonomous technology is correct, the law may instead tend
systematically to support the social and cultural incorporation of efficient
technologies.
In previous work, Ihave looked atjudicial decisions involving advanced
technologies to see if there is a pattern in which the law tends to resolve
disputes in ways that ease the integration of the technology into the culture,
rather than recognizing and permitting opposition to the technology." In
this previous work, I have suggested that one can discern such a pattern in
our legal rules and concepts. In the course of this work, I began to wonder
11.

Winner, ibid at 238.
12. Ibid at 234.
13. Ibid at 235.
14. This is not to say that legal scholars have ignored the interaction between law and technology.
Many legal scholars have noted the ways in which the law does or ought to affect technological
innovation, and some have approached the prior question of whether the law can affect technological
innovation, noting problems such as the way in which the law tends to lag behind scientific and
technological innovation. However, the thesis of the autonomy of technology challenges, at a
fundamental and less well-explored level, the ability of humans and human societies freely to use the
law to adopt or reject new technologies.
15. Chandler,supranote 4. In this work I pointed to two examples. First, the doctrine of mitigation
as applied in personal injury cases denies compensation to negligently injured plaintiffs who refuse
certain forms of medical treatment. Second, the judicial framing of some disputes tends to make the
effects of a technology invisible and to treat the harm of those who reject a technology as self-inflicted.
For example, in a dispute having to do with the drift of genetically modified canola pollen onto the
fields of organic farmers, the trial judge was receptive to the argument that the harm suffered by
organic farmers flowed from their decision to adhere to organic certification standards that reject GM
pollen rather than from the GM pollen itself.
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whether this pattern would exist in cases where the technology challenged
the legal system and judicial ideology directly, rather than involving the
courts simply as arbiters of technological disputes in other areas of human
activity. In other words, how would the courts react to a technological
challenge to the traditions of the law or legal system itself? The present
paper seeks to explore this question by looking at how courts have reacted
to lie detection technologies, and, in particular, how they are likely to react
to neuroscientific lie detection. Neuroscientific methods of lie detection
would present a direct technological challenge to the cherished and wellguarded function of the trier of fact-credibility assessment.
If technology is autonomous, then we would expect to find the legal
system to be structured in a way that would eventually adapt and absorb
an effective novel technology, regardless of a clash with traditional legal
custom and values. In the discussion that follows, I trace the judicial
treatment of polygraph and DNA evidence in order to make the argument
that misgivings about the "dehumanization" of the justice system and the
usurpation ofquintessentially human functions by machines will not prevent
the adoption of effective novel technologies including neuroscientific
techniques of lie detection (should they be shown to be reliable). Instead,
we will become habituated to the artificiality or "unnaturalness" of the
new methods, as we have become accustomed to a whole range of tools
and techniques we have adopted through human history, and will cease to
view them as problematic.
II. Lie detection technologies
The detection of deception has long been a preoccupation in human
societies, and ancient societies have used various telltale physiological
signs as clues to identify liars.16 The human assessment of demeanour is
also an important part of the determination of credibility in the modem
trial context. The central role of demeanour assessment in determining
credibility is underscored by the deference shown by appellate courts to
trial courts on findings of fact. This deference is said to be justified by the
fact that trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanour of
witnesses while the appellate court must rely on transcripts alone.
The invention of the polygraph machine in the early 2 0th century
represents an attempt to make the process of physiological assessment
more objective and reliable. The polygraph test measures a group of
physiological responses that are sometimes associated with deceptive

16. Kerry Segrave, Lie Detectors:A Social History (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2004)
at 4.
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behaviour including breathing rate, perspiration, heart rate and blood
pressure.' The reliability of the polygraph test is uncertain and it is also
potentially subject to countermeasures by examinees."
More recently, various neuroscientific methods have been suggested
as the next generation of lie detection technologies. 9 Two of the key
technologies are functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the
so-called "brain fingerprint," which is a form of electroencephalography.
FMRI technology is able to distinguish the levels of blood oxygenation
in different parts of the brain. Since metabolically active and inactive
locations in the brain have different patterns of blood oxygenation, fMRI
permits an investigator to infer patterns of brain activation from the fMRI
images.2 0 Recent studies have explored the use of fMRI for the detection
of deception, and it has been suggested that there are different patterns of
localized brain activation associated with deceptive and truthful responses
to questioning. 2' Attempts are being made to commercialize fMRI for lie
detection. Cephos Corp. and No Lie MRI, Inc. offer fMRI lie detection
services to voluntary subjects who wish to demonstrate their truthfulness,
and both companies aim to have their tests admitted as evidence in U.S.
courts. 22
The "brain fingerprint" relies on electroencephalography to pick
up electrical activity within the brain. One electrical signal, known as
P300, has been demonstrated to be elicited when a subject is presented
with a meaningful stimulus. 23 The possible utility in the criminal context
is that one might try to identify a perpetrator by testing for recognition
of specific details related to the crime. 24 A key proponent of its use for

17.

U.S. National Academy of Science, National Research Council, The Polygraph andLie Detection
(Washington: National Academies Press, 2003) online: National Academies Press <http://www.nap.
edulopenbook.php?isbn=0309084369>, at 12-13, 213 [Nat. Acad. Sci.J; Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes,
"Neur6science-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation" (2007) 33 Am. J. L. & Med.,
377 [Greely & Illes].
18. Nat. Acad. Sci., ibid. at 214.
19. Greely & Illes, supra note 17 at 385.
20. Nat. Acad. Sci., supra note 17 at 2; Ibid. at 380.
21. Nat. Acad. Sci., ibid. at 159; Greely & lies, ibid at 394.
22. Cephos Corporation, "fMRI Testing and Legal Admissibility" online: <http://www.cephoscorp.
com/lie-detection/index.php#admissibility>; Emily Murphy, "No Lie MRI being offered as evidence
in court" Stanford Center for Law & the Biosciences Blog (14 March 2009) online: <http://.
lawandbiosciences.wordpress. com/2009/03/14/no-lie-mri-being-offered-as-evidence-in-court/>.
23. Ewout H. Meijer, Fren T.Y. Smulders & Ann Wolf, "The Contribution of Mere Recognition to the
P300 Effect in a Concealed Information Test" (2009) 34 Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback
221.
24. Ibid. and Jinsun Hahm et al., "Detection of Concealed Information: Combining a Virtual Mock
Crime with a P300-based Guilty Knowledge Test" (2009) 12(3) CyberPsychology & Behavior 269
[Hahm et al.].
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lie detection, Lawrence Farwell, is attempting to commercialize "brain
fingerprinting."2 5
The reliability of these techniques for lie detection is currently
disputed.2 6 In the U.S., they have surfaced in only a handful of cases
and there has not yet been a thorough judicial analysis of their reliability
and admissibility.27 There appears to have been a conviction for murder
reached, in part, on the basis of a form of "brain fingerprint" in India.28
The judge in the Indian case cited this evidence as proof that the accused
had "experiential knowledge" about the crime that only the killer could
possess.29 In April 2009, she was released on bail pending appeal. 30 The
bail order questions the guilty verdict on the basis of some inconsistencies
in the evidence, but does not mention the brain fingerprint evidence.
III. Credibilitydetermination in court
In a trial, the trier of fact (the jury, or the judge where it is a judge-alone
trial) must ascertain what happened. This process of "finding the facts"
involves the consideration of evidence presented by the parties. The
parties may themselves testify, they may call other witnesses to testify and
they may produce physical evidence such as objects or documents.
One key problem for the trier of fact is the credibility of testimony,
and in some cases there may be little evidence available other than the
competing accounts of the parties. Credibility determination is not
just a matter of deciding whether a witness is lying or not. There are
various reasons why a witness may not speak the truth. The witness
may knowingly lie or mislead, the witness may have convinced him or
<http://www.
25. Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Inc., "Technology Overview" online:
brainwavescience.com/TechnologyOverview.php>.
26. Greely & Illes, supra note 17; Hahm et al. supra note 24 at 273; Emilio Bizzi et al., Using
Imaging to Identify Deceit: Scientific andEthical Questions, (Cambridge: American Academy ofArts
& Sciences, 2009).
27. Teneille Brown, "Request to admit No Lie MRI report in California case is withdrawn" Stanford
Centerfor Law & the Biosciences Blog (25 March 2009), online: <http://lawandbiosciences.wordpress.
Lebron v.
com/2009/03/25/request-to-admit-no-lie-mri-report-in-califomia-case-is-withdrawn/>;
Sanders, No. 02 Civ. 6327 (RPP), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35588 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23 2005); Alexis
Madrigal, "MRI Lie Detection to Get First Day in Court" Wired.com (16 March 2009), online: Wired
Science <http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/03/noliemri/>; Slaughter v. State, 2005 OK CR 2,
(Okla. Cr. App. 2005); State v. Harrington,659 N.W. 2d 509 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 2003).
28. Anand Giridharadas, "India's Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts is Debated" New York Times
(14 September 2008) AIO, online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/world/
asia/15brainscan.html/>.
29. State of Maharashtrav. Sharma, (2008), Sessions Case No. 508/07, (Court of Sessions, Pune
District, India), at paras. 11, 97-118, online: Stanford Centerfor Law & the Biosciences Blog <http://
lawandbiosciences.files.wordpress.com/2008/12/ beosruling2.pdf>.
30. Sharma v. State ofMaharashira,(2008), (Bail Order, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction, High Court
at Bombay, India), online: Stanford CenterforLaw & the Biosciences Blog <http://lawandbiosciences.
files.wordpress.com/2009/04/iditis-bail-orderl.pdf >.
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herself of a set of untrue facts, or the witness may have defects in memory,
understanding or perception that cause him or her to unknowingly provide
untrue facts. Ascertaining the truth requires a fact finder to consider all of
these possibilities. It is important to emphasize this point because even
a perfect method of lie detection would not assure the truth of testimony,
given the other possible sources of unreliability, although it may at least
identify deliberate untruths.
Credibility assessment depends on two main sources of information.3 1
First, the trier of fact will observe a witness's demeanour while testifying.
Second, the trier of fact will consider the plausibility of the witness's
statements in the context of the trier of fact's general knowledge about the
world and human behaviour, and in the context of the rest of the evidence
presented in the trial.
Turning first to credibility assessment based on demeanour, the
experimental evidence suggests that people are generally rather poor at
detecting deception when they must do so on the basis of demeanour
alone.3 2 On average, they score only a bit better than 50% accuracy in
experimental settings." Some people whose professional role requires
them to detect liars do somewhat better than average (e.g., secret service
members), but many such groups reflect roughly the same success rate in
detecting deception in experimental settings as do ordinary people.34 In
two studies by Ekman et al., judges appeared, on average, to be correct
about 60% of the time. 5 The experiments of Vrij et al. suggest that
members in a range of occupational groups achieve about 60% accuracy
in detecting deception in children, adolescents and adults.36
There is also a risk that failures in assessing credibility might vary
according to the culture or ethnicity of the witnesses and fact finders.
Demeanour appears to be culturally sensitive so that finders of fact may
misinterpret the respectful or embarrassed avoidance of eye contact as a

31. Randolph N. Jonakait, The American Jury System (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2003) at
56 [Jonakait].
32. Ekman & O'Sullivan (1991), supranote 2.
33. Ibid; Joseph W. Rand, "The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection and the Jury" (2000) 33 Conn.
L. Rev. I at 51-54 [Rand].
34. Ekman & O'Sullivan (1991), ibid
35. Ibid; Ekman, O'Sullivan & Frank (1999), supranote 2.
36. Vrij el al., supra note 2.
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sign of evasiveness." As a result, there may be troubling systematic
biases in the assessment of demeanour that may work against cultural or
ethnic minorities in a society.
Although this experimental evidence is not reassuring, it is not
clear whether it reflects the actual skill of judges and juries in assessing
demeanour. The experiments are open to the criticism that the behaviour
of the parties is likely to be affected by the artificiality of the setting."
Another objection is that experiments on demeanour assessment, even if
they are very robust, may say little about real-world credibility assessment
since people often make use of additional information beyond demeanour
in assessing credibility.39 Indeed, in the trial context, triers of fact are
often able to use other evidence as well as their general knowledge about
the world and human behaviour in order to assess the plausibility of a
witness's testimony.
However, this last objection is weakened by the following observations.
If these other sources of information are unavailable, ignored, or faulty
in some way, a trier of fact's decision may be based on the seemingly
shaky foundation of demeanour assessment. For example, where a trier
of fact is uncertain or under time pressure, he or she may quickly make an
intuitive judgment of credibility based on demeanour rather than on the
more laborious and demanding process of carefully sifting the evidence
for consistency.4 0 In addition, the "general knowledge about the world
and human behaviour" that a finder of fact uses in order to measure the
plausibility .of a witness's testimony may also be affected by pervasive
myths and stereotypes about the behaviour of certain groups. Some
courts have noted the risk that myths and stereotypes about the behaviour
of complainants might affect the assessment of their credibility in sexual

37. F. Kaufman, Report of the Kaufman Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin.
(Ontario: Publications Ontario, 1999) online: Ministry of the Attorney General <http://www.
attorneygencral jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/>. The Report mentions this problem at p.
1147:
Mr. Brodeur also pointed out that demeanour is culturally sensitive. He cited the example
of aboriginals in Australia. Non-aboriginal Australians can make hasty and erroneous
interpietations of aboriginal behaviour. Aboriginal body language and behaviour is
markedly different than that of non-aboriginals. Looking someone in the face, for instance,
is a mark of disrespect to the former and a mark of truth to the latter. Mr. Brodeur stated
that aboriginals very often lose custody of their children because judges misinterpret their
(apparently evasive) behaviour in court.
See also Rand, supra note 33.
38. Jonakait, supranote 31.
39. Hee Sun Park et al., "How People Really Detect Lies" (2002) 69 Communication Monographs
144.
40. Ibid.
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assault cases, 41 and that racist stereotypes may also affect the assessment
of an accused's credibility. 42
In sum, it is difficult to assess the capacity of the trier of fact to identify
deception in the real-world setting of a trial where multiple sources of
information may be available. However, there are good reasons to be
concerned that judgments of credibility based on demeanour alone are
not particularly reliable, and that we cannot always depend upon the
availability or robustness of other information such as third-party evidence
or the general knowledge of the trier of fact. Nonetheless, the trier of fact
will often be able to rely not just on demeanour in determining credibility
but also on the content of a witness's statement, including the coherence,
consistency and completeness of the story and the absence of plausible
alternatives.
1. Usurping the function of the trieroffact
Given the foregoing, the confidence of the legal system in the human
capacity to assess credibility based on demeanour is interesting. This
confidence is demonstrated in many ways, such as in the deference of
appellate courts to trial courts on findings of fact. 43 Although an appellate
court will have the transcripts of testimony, it does not have the ability to
observe the demeanour of the witnesses and so is considered to be less able
to assess credibility. 44 The Canadian Supreme Court has written that,
[i]t is, of course, true that the assessment of the credibility of a witness is
more of an "art than a science" ... It is the highly individualistic nature
of a determination of credibility, and its dependence on intangibles
such as demeanour and the manner of testifying, that leads to the wellestablished principle that appellate courts will generally defer to the trial
45
judge's factual findings, particularly those pertaining to credibility.
The Supreme Court's use of the common turn of phrase "more of an art
than a science" is meant to suggest that credibility determination is a
messy, intuitive business that cannot be reduced to a clear set of rules.

Why, then, are we so confident in the human ability to identify deception,
41. R. v. Find,2001 SCC 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863.
42. R. v. Williams, [1998] I S.C.R. 1128 at para. 28.
43. S. Casey Hill et al., eds., McWilliams'CanadianCriminal Evidence, 4' ed. (Aurora: Canada
Law Book, 2003) at s. 27:30.10 [McWilliams'].
44. The Ontario Court of Appeal noted in R. v. Howe (2005), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 480 at 488 that "[a]n
appellate court must always bear in mind the significant advantage enjoyed by the trial judge when
it comes to assessing credibility... [T]he trial judge doubtless paid careful attention not only to what
was said, but to how it was said. A lifeless transcript of the testimony cannot possibly replicate the
unfolding of the narrative at trial." Cited in McWilliams', ibid at s. 27:30.10.
45. R. v. S. (RD.), [199713 S.C.R. 484 at para. 128.
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and what would happen if a technological approach based on neuroscience
were demonstrably superior to this messy human art?
In addition to appellate deference to trial-level fact-finding, the rules
of evidence also reflect a firm belief in the ability of the jury to assess
credibility. As the Canadian Supreme Court said in rejecting polygraph
evidence, "[i]t is a basic tenet of our legal system that judges and juries are
capable of assessing credibility and reliability of evidence."4 6 The courts
defend this function of the trier of fact with a vigour that causes one to
wonder about the deeper ideologies at work. The categorical assertion of
the trier of fact's competence to assess credibility, despite experimental
evidence to suggest that people are quite bad at certain aspects of
credibility assessment (particularly assessing demeanour), seems more
like an argument aimed at forestalling challenge than an objective assertion
of fact. Furthermore, there is actual inconsistency in the legal system's
approach to demeanour evidence. Although deference to the trial court's
findings of fact is said to be based on the court's advantage in being able to
observe demeanour, the legal system cautions juries about the dangers of
relying on demeanour evidence. The Canadian Judicial Council's model
jury instruction suggests that judges should tell juries the following:
What was the witness's manner when he or she testified? Do not jump to
conclusions, however, based entirely on how a witness has testified. Looks
can be deceiving. Giving evidence in a trial is not a common experience
for many witnesses. People react and appear differently. Witnesses
come from different backgrounds. They have different abilities, values
and life experiences. There are simply too many variables to make the
manner in which a witness testifies the only or most important factor in
your decision.47
Where the trier of fact is a judge rather than a jury, a similar note of
caution can be detected. In R. v. Hull, the Court of Appeal overturned the
trial judge, stating that her refusal to draw conclusions or inferences from
demeanour was an error because "the trial judge focused improperly on
the issue of demeanour in isolation and, as a result, overstated the cautions
relating to the use of demeanour."4 8 In other words, the trial judge must
consider demeanour because it is presumed to be relevant to credibility,
and yet, demeanour alone is too dangerous to use for this purpose.
46. R. v. Bdland, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398 at para. 17 [Bland].
47. Canadian Judicial.Council, "Assessment of Evidence" Model Jury Instruction (February 2004)
s. 9.4 at para. 10, online: Canadian Judicial Council <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.calenglish/lawyers
en.asp?selMenu=lawyerspmf generalprinciples_en.asp#4>. Cited in McWilliams, supra note 43 at
s. 27:30: 10.
48. R. v. Hull [2006] 70 W.C.B. (2d) 274 (C.A.) at para. 9.
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Why is it that the courts staunchly defend credibility assessment as
the "province of the jury," when there are reasons to be concerned about
the trier of fact's ability to judge credibility? Second, how long would
this defence hold in the face of solid evidence of a more reliable means of
judging credibility? I believe that the answers to these questions primarily
have to do with preserving the legitimacy of the judicial system by
supporting the belief that it produces correct verdicts. George Fisher has
suggested that the rise of the jury as a method of finding facts in a trial is
explained by the need to preserve the appearance of accuracy, rather than
the achievement of actual accuracy in assessing credibility.
[A]lthough the jury does not guarantee accurate lie detecting, it does
detect lies in a way that appears accurate, or at least in a way that hides
the source of any inaccuracy from the public's gaze. By permitting the
jury to resolve credibility conflicts in the black box of the jury room, the
criminal justice system can present to the public an "answer"-a single
verdict of guilty or not guilty-that resolves all questions of credibility
in a way that is largely immune from challenge or review. By making the
jury its lie detector, the system protects its own legitimacy.49
Despite our modern faith in the jury as fact-finder, Fisher explains that we
only relatively recently accepted that jurors have the capacity to determine
contests of credibility in criminal trials.so Before the jury was entrusted
with settling these conflicts, the system relied on the oath to justify a
belief in a witness's truthfulness, and the system carefully avoided the
embarrassment of conflicting oaths by limiting for a long while an accused's
ability to testify under oath or to call sworn witnesses." Fisher concludes
that the gradual rise of the jury to the point where we confidently presume
its competence to assess credibility despite evidence to the contrary can
be explained by the problem of maintaining the legitimacy of the legal
system.
The inexorable flow of fact finding power to the jury was due, finally, to
the jury's capacity to erase all blemishes... The jury's hidden decisionmaking process and its one- or two-word verdicts leave all mistakes and
causes for criticism locked in the black box of the jury room.52

49. George Fisher, "The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector" (1997) 107 Yale L. J. 575 at 578-579.
50. Ibid. at 579.
51. Ibid at 583. Fisher notes that "by staking its verdicts on the oaths of witnesses, the justice
system found it could claim that the threat of divine vengeance assured truthful outcomes. Rules that
permitted only the prosecution to call witnesses helped, in turn, to protect the legitimacy of the oath
by guarding against the embarrassment of conflicting oaths." See also ibid. at 704.
52. Ibid. at 706.
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However, if a technology arises that can challenge these "black box"
determinations of credibility, the justice system will have to accept the
technology notwithstanding concerns about the dehumanization of the
justice system.or the erosion of the province of the jury. As will be
discussed further below, the rapid shift in how the legal system reacted to
DNA evidence, moving swiftly from a concern that it would dehumanize
the justice system to the position that it is critical evidence, illustrates
this point. DNA technology has reached a degree of acceptance that it
can successfully claim to be able to reveal miscarriages of justice and so
must be integrated into the trial process. Lie detection technologies on
the other hand are currently undeveloped and unproven. If neuroscientific
technologies come to be viewed as reliable for lie detection, however, I
suspect that the legal rules governing the admissibility of evidence would
permit them to be admitted in court, notwithstanding the attachment to the
idea that credibility determination is a human function.
IV The legal rules applicableto the admissibilityof neuroscientific
evidence for lie detection
In a criminal prosecution, both the accused and the prosecution may be
interested in adducing neuroscientific evidence. They may wish to use
it to demonstrate the truthfulness of one of their own witnesses, or they
may wish to challenge the truthfulness of a witness for the other side. A
party wishing to do so will need to introduce this evidence through an
expert witness who can interpret it for the court. The laws of evidence
dealing with the admissibility of novel scientific evidence and expert
evidence will apply to determine whether this information is admissible in
a trial. Although neuroscientific evidence such as neuro-imaging has been
admitted for some purposes, such as showing damage to brain structures,
its use for lie detection is novel in the legal context and so it will be
scrutinized under the rules applicable to novel scientific evidence.
In addition to the rules of evidence, constitutional human rights
guarantees are relevant. If the state seeks to obtain and use neuroscientific
evidence against an accused person, constitutional provisions related to the
privilege against self-incrimination and the freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure will be relevant." On the other hand, if the accused's
request to adduce neuroscientific evidence is refused, the constitutional
protection of the right to make full answer and defence will be at issue.

53. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 11(c) and 8.
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In the following discussion, I will draw upon the way the courts
have reacted to two forms of scientific evidence, namely the polygraph
and DNA evidence, to trace how the rules of evidence and constitutional
protections are likely to apply where an accused person seeks to introduce
exculpatory neuroscientific evidence for lie detection. The story that will
emerge is that this evidence is unlikely to be admissible for this purpose
at the moment because it has not been demonstrated to be sufficiently
reliable. However, a review of the courts' reasoning in the polygraph and
DNA cases suggests that reliability, rather than other often-stated concerns
about the dehumanization of the justice system will be the fundamental
reason to reject neuroscientific lie detection at present. Should that
evidence become reliable, it is likely to be accepted notwithstanding
concerns about dehumanization and the defense of the human function of
assessing credibility in trials.
1. Expert evidence, novel scientific evidence and lie detection
technologies
It makes sense to look at the judicial reactions to the polygraph test in
seeking to predict how neuroscientific lie detection will be handled given
that both are intended to provide evidence of veracity or deception. The
Supreme Court of Canada rejected polygraph evidence in a split 3:2
decision in R. v. Beland.54 The general structure of the applicable rules of
evidence can be summarized as a set of four conditions of admissibility
drawn from the rules on expert evidence and one additional condition
drawn from the rules on novel scientific evidence. I outline these in the
next paragraph, after which I go on to discuss their application in the
context of lie detection technologies.
The courts restrict the admissibility of expert evidence in order to
ensure that the expert opinion will be reliable and useful and to reduce the
risk that the expert will "take over" the fact-finding function from the judge
or jury. In order to achieve these objectives, courts admit expert evidence
only if (1) the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case; (2) the evidence
is necessary to assist the trier of fact; (3) the evidence does not violate an
exclusionary rule of evidence; and (4) the witness is a properly qualified
expert." If the expert is to give evidence that constitutes "novel scientific
evidence" the courts also demand that the evidence pass a threshold of

54. Biland, supra note 46. Bilandpredated the cases of R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 [Mohan] and
R. v.J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600 [1-L.], which provided the more modem articulation
of the rules of evidence pertaining to experts and novel scientific evidence. However, the same types
of considerations as were raised in Bland would also arise under the more modem approach.
55. Mohan, ibid. and J-L.J, ibid.
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reliability. The key concerns underlying the restrictions on admitting
novel scientific evidence are that the trier of fact may be overawed by
the "mystique of science"s" and may simply defer uncritically to scientific
evidence. As the Canadian Supreme Court has put it, there is a risk that a
jury might accept scientific evidence as "virtually infallible and as.having
more weight than it deserves" when "[d]ressed up in scientific language
which the jury does not easily understand and submitted through a witness
of impressive antecedents.""
Starting first with the condition of relevance, the Canadian courts have
stated that there are two considerations to address. First, the evidence
must be logically relevant, meaning that if must have some tendency to
make the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than it would
be in the absence of the evidence. Second, the Supreme Court has built a
cost-benefit analysis into the relevance inquiry. In other words, relevance
(as the court defines it) also requires that the value of the evidence to the
trial process be greater than its costs in terms of the impact on the trial
process."
It is at this second stage that one might expect objections to
neuroscientific lie detection. Past cases have pointed to such harms to the
trial process as the inordinate consumption of time, prejudice, confusion,
and distortion ofthe fact-finding purpose resulting from undue weight being
given by the jury to evidence "cloaked under the mystique of science."5
Another concern related to expert testimony is that expert evidence is
"highly resistant to effective cross-examination by counsel who are not
experts" and so the trier of fact will have trouble assessing expert evidence
if there is no competing expert evidence.60 In addition, expert evidence is
time-consuming and expensive, and the proliferation of expert evidence
imposes costs that strain both the parties' and judicial resources. 6' Several
of these concerns (particularly those related to the "mystique of science")
were raised against the polygraph and might well be raised against
neuroscientific lie detection. As will be seen below, however, this fear is a
flimsy reason to reject scientific evidence. It was quickly discarded in the
context of DNA evidence, and has been rejected by a majority of the U.S.
56. The Supreme Court of Canada referred to "evidence cloaked under the mystique of science"
in the polygraph context in Bland, supra note 46 at paras. 20, 58, and the Ontario Court of Appeal
warned of the "mystic infallibility" of science in the DNA context in R. v. Terceira (1998), 38 O.,R.
(3d) 175 (C.A.) at para. 55 [Terceira] (aff'd [1999] 3 S.C.R. 866).
57. Mohan, supra note 54 at 21.
58 Ibid. at para. 18.
59. Beland,supra note 46 at 434, cited in J.-L.J., supra note 54 at para. 55.
60. R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275 at para. 54 [D.D.].
61. Ibid at para. 56.
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Supreme Court as demeaning of the jury's competence in the polygraph
context 62
The second condition of admissibility is that the expert evidence be
necessary to assist the trier of fact 6 rather than merely helpful to the trier
of fact." Put another way, the expert must provide information that is
likely to be outside the experience or knowledge of the trier of fact and
that is needed to enable the trier of fact to appreciate the matters in issue
and form a correct judgment about them. 65
Expert evidence to support credibility is thought to be unnecessary
because triers of fact are considered to have the capacity to assess
credibility and reliability. The courts also express the fear that because
the determination of credibility is difficult, triers of fact are particularly
vulnerable to simply deferring to the experts on this point if they are
permitted to hear expert evidence on credibility.66 In rejecting polygraph
evidence, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the sole
issue addressed by the polygraph is credibility, that "[i]t is a basic tenet of
our legal system that judges and juries are capable of assessing credibility
and reliability of evidence," and that "no expert evidence is required" on
this point.67
The faith of the legal system in the capacity of the trier of fact to
assess credibility, and the need to preserve that function from usurpation
by experts, surfaces repeatedly as the rules of evidence are applied to
determine the admissibility of evidence on credibility. As noted above,
these concerns formed part of the reasoning about whether the evidence
was relevant, they arise again in the context of necessity, and will be seen
again further below in the discussion of the exclusionary rules. Strangely,
this emphatic confidence in the capacity of the trier of fact is belied both by
other practices in the legal system (such as model jury instructions warning
of the frailty of demeanour assessment and judicial statements about the
risk of cross-cultural misunderstanding in-demeanour assessment) as well
as by outside experimental evidence as was noted above in Part III. It is
also worth noting that the courts do in fact accept expert evidence related to
credibility in other situations. Expert psychological evidence is admissible
in situations where triers of fact commonly make erroneous assumptions
regarding credibility, such as that a child's recantation of a sexual assault
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) [Scheffer].
Mohan, supra note 54 at para. 22.
J-L.J., supranote 54 at para. 56.
Ibid. at paras. 30-31.
R. v. Marquard,[1993] 4 S.C.R. 223 at para. 49 [Marquard];D.D., supranote 60 at para. 53.
Beland, supra note 46 at para. 17.

104 The Dalhousie Law Journal
allegation necessarily indicates that the assault did not happen.6 8 On this
point, the courts make a fine distinction, requiring the expert to speak
about the often-misunderstood behaviour in general without opining on
whether the particular witness is or is not telling the truth.69
In light of these reasons to question the ability of the trier of fact to
detect deception, it seems reasonably arguable that reliableneuroscientific
evidence may well be necessary in some cases to assist with credibility
assessment in the sense that the average person may well come to an
incorrect judgment without it. The strength of this argument will likely
vary according to the case, as people are probably more apt to make errors
where credibility assessment is based mostly or entirely on demeanour
alone.
The third condition of admissibility of expert evidence is that the
evidence not offend one of the exclusionary rules of evidence. Evidence
law contains a series of. exclusionary rules, of which a number have
been raised to exclude polygraph evidence. The same exclusionary rules
are likely to arise with neuroscientific lie detection. A discussion of the
following exclusionary rules follows: the rule against oath-helping, the
rule against prior consistent statements, and the rules regarding character
evidence.
The traditional rule against "oath-helping" prevents a party from
presenting evidence the sole purpose of which is to bolster the credibility
of that party's own witness.70 The majority of the Canadian Supreme
Court wrote in Bland that polygraph evidence has no purpose other than
to bolster credibility and so offends this rule.n A closer examination of
the underlying rationale for the rule against oath-helping reveals it to offer
only a shaky reason to reject evidence from lie detection technologies.
Three sets of justifications are at the root of the rule against oathhelping.72 First, the determination of credibility is within the province of
the trier of fact, and oath-helping invades that province. Implicit in this
68. David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at
179 [Paciocco & Stuesser].
69. As the Ontario Court of Appeal put it in R. v. Llorenz (2000), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 535 (Ont. C.A.)
at para. 28: "The line to be drawn when evidence is considered to be oath-helping is not always clear.
There is a distinction to be made between (1) evidence about credibility (i.e. in my opinion the witness
is truthful), which is inadmissible and (2) evidence about a feature of the witness's behaviour or
testimony, which may be admissible even though it will likely have some bearing on the trier of fact's
ultimate determination of the question of credibility."
70. Bdland, supra note 46 at para. 7; McWilliams', supra note 43 at s. 18:40; Paciocco & Stuesser,
supra note 68 at 177.
71. Beland, supra note 46 at para. 9.
72. Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 68 at 177; Bland, ibid.at para. 7; Mc Williams', supra note 43
at s. 11:20:50.
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justification are the premises that the trier of fact is capable of determining
credibility and is the only acceptable means by which credibility should
be determined." As noted above, this assumption that the trier of fact is
capable of determining credibility seems shaky. The second justification
for the rule against oath-helping is that the admission of oath-helping
evidence would complicate trials and create distracting side-issues for the
trier of fact. In Bland, the majority was worried that admitting oathhelping evidence such as the polygraph would distract the court from the
main issues toward a debate over the interpretation of the polygraph or
to a battle between competing polygraph experts.14 While the admission
of technological lie detection evidence would probably cause this type of
problem, this must be balanced against the improvements to the process
that reliable evidence might provide. The Bland majority clearly had
this balancing in mind in saying that "there is no reason why the rules
of evidence should not be modified where improvement will result ...
[but the polygraph] will disrupt proceedings, cause delays, and lead to
numerous complications which will result in no greater degree of certainty
in the process than that which already exists."" Third, it is sometimes said
that the common law presumes witnesses to be truthful until their veracity
is questioned and so oath-helping is unnecessary. 6 This last point is a
doubtful justification for the rule against oath-helping given that accused
persons, accomplices and women in sexual assault cases are commonly
stereotyped as untruthful.
The rule against prior consistent statements was also invoked to
exclude polygraph evidence in R. v. Bland. This rule states that, in a
criminal trial, it is generally inadmissible to support a witness's credibility
by showing that the witness made prior statements to the same effect" A
series ofjustifications are often suggested for this rule, including that such
self-serving evidence is easily fabricated,7 9 that repetition is irrelevant to
whether a statement is truthful,"0 and that the admission of prior consistent
statements will just consume time and complicate the trial."

73. Marquard,supra note 66 at para. 49.
74. Bdland, supra note 46 at para. 20.
75. Ibid. at para. 19.
76. McWilliams', supra note 43 at s. 11:20.50.
77. Ibid
78. R. v. Stirling, 2008 SCC 10, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 272 at para. 5; Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 68
at 445; Mc Williams', supra note 43 at s. 11:10.
79. Mc Williams', ibid. at s. 11:20:30; Bland,supranote 46 at para. 10.
80. Stirling,supra note 78 at para. 7; McWilliams', ibid. at s. 11:20.10.
81. McWilliams', ibid at s. 11:20.40.
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In Bland, the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court viewed
evidence of the accused's statements during the polygraph-test as nothing
more than a repetition of statements that the accused made again during
the trial. As a result, these were useless since repetition does not imply the
statements are true.8 2 The dissenting judges, correctly in my view, pointed
out that polygraph evidence is not just a repetition of statements that the
accused makes at trial. Instead, it constitutes expert evidence on whether
a person's physiological responses when making a particular statement
corresponded with those of someone telling the truth." This is evidence
that goes beyond merely showing a person said a similar thing on other
occasions. As a result, this ground for excluding lie detection evidence
ought not to apply.
However, repetitiveness was not the only ground upon which the
majority applied the rule against prior consistent statements to polygraph
evidence in Bland. The majority also stated that it was too easy for the
accused to fabricate favourable evidence since the accused could take the
test as many times as needed to get the desired result.84 The dissenting
judges were not persuaded by these arguments and felt that the concern
about manipulation of the results should affect the weight to be given to
the evidence rather than its admissibility." Whether or not this concern
will be a weighty one in the context of neuroscientific lie detection depends
upon whether those results can be manipulated-an issue that once again
boils down to an issue of reliability.
The third set of exclusionary rules applied by the Bland majority to
exclude polygraph evidence were the rules regarding character evidence.
While a person's character is considered relevant to credibility,' 6 the law of
evidence restricts the introduction of character evidence in order to prevent
the undue consumption of time. The concern is that if an accused person
calls a plethora of witnesses each of whom seeks to testify as to particular
incidents demonstrating the accused's good character, there would need to
be a mini-trial to assess each incident.87 As a result, the rules of evidence
prevent witnesses from testifying as to specific instances of good conduct,
and allow them to testify only as to the accused's general reputation in the
community."

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Biland,supra note 46 at para. 10.
Ibid at para. 32.
Ibid at para. 11.
Ibid. at para. 33.
McWilliams', supra note 43 at s. 9:20.20; Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 68 at 443.
Paciocco & Stuesser, ibid at 79; Bland,supranote 46 at para. 7.
Mc Williams', supra note 43 at s. 9:40.10.
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The majority in Beland held that a polygraph expert could not
testify regarding an accused's performance in a polygraph test because
this amounted to evidence regarding a specific incident rather than the
accused's general reputation in the community." The dissenting judges,
on the other hand, questioned whether polygraph evidence was really a
form of character evidence. The difficulty with the majority's reasoning is
that polygraph evidence is not primarily meant to prove good character.90
Instead, it is meant to demonstrate that a specific statement was truthful
when it was uttered, regardless of the general honesty or other character
traits of the accused. As for the concern that trial time will be consumed
with disputes over the good deeds of the accused if evidence of specific
good deeds is admitted, the problem is much more constrained in the
case of lie detection technologies. In order to prove an accused has a
generally truthful character, it may well be necessary to demonstrate as
many instances of truthfulness as possible-raising a concern about timeconsuming disputes over whether the various instances of truthfulness
occurred and whether they reliably point to a generally truthful character.
In the case of lie detection evidence, the evidence is meant to establish
directly a specific instance of truthfulness rather than the general character
trait of truthfulness. It is indeed possible that the lie detection evidence
itself might be disputed, but this is a more restricted problem than that of
a general review of all of the accused's instances of truthful behaviour,
which might indeed consume a lot of time. As a result, there are reasonable
grounds to question the rejection of polygraph evidence on this basis, and
by extension to question whether character evidence rules must necessarily
lead to the rejection of neuroscientific lie detection.
In sum, the Blandmajorityrejected polygraph evidence in Canada on
the basis that it was not only unnecessary since the trier of fact was capable
of assessing credibility, but it was risky because the trier of fact may defer
to the expert polygrapher due to the "mystique of science." In addition,
in the majority's view, polygraph evidence violated the exclusionary rules
of evidence dealing with oath-helping, prior consistent statements, and
character evidence. The foregoing discussion has suggested that these
arguments are somewhat weak in light of evidence of the generally
poor human capacity to detect deception as well as in light of a closer
examination of the fundamental rationales for the exclusionary rules.
That being said, the rules for the admission of "novel scientific
evidence" do present a more robust bar to the admission of polygraph
89.
90.

Bland, supra note 46 at para. 14.
Ibid. at paras. 34-36.
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evidence as well as neuroscientific evidence for lie detection. In order to be
admissible, novel scientific evidence must meet a threshold of reliability.
The Canadian Supreme Court has stated that the criteria for determining
if novel scientific evidence meets the basic threshold test of reliability are
(1) whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested, (2) whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication,
(3) the known or potential rate of error, or the existence of standards, and
(4) whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted.9 1 These
criteria are similar to those set out by the U.S. Supreme Court for the same
purpose in Daubert v. Merrell Dow PharmaceuticalsInc.92
The Bland majority made no finding on the reliability of the
polygraph, stating it had not been provided with sufficient evidence on
this point.9 3 As noted above, they rejected polygraph evidence on the
basis it was unnecessary, and that it violated various exclusionary rules
of evidence. Most but not all American jurisdictions consider polygraph
evidence not to meet the reliability standard for admissibility. 94 The 1923
American decision in Frye v. United States95 rejected polygraph evidence
on the ground that it had not yet become "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
The more recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in US. v. Scheffer
dealt with the accused's constitutional challenge to the Military Rules of
Evidence, and declared polygraph evidence inadmissible.96 The majority
decision was split among three judgments, with the result that the only
shared basis for the rejection of the polygraph evidence was its lack of
reliability.97 Four of the nine judges also justified their decision on grounds
that are familiar from the Canadian B6land decision, namely, the need to
preserve "the jury's core function of making credibility determinations
in criminal trials" and the need to avoid lengthy litigation over collateral
issues.98 The other five judges expressly rejected these additional reasons
to reject the polygraph evidence, stating that the jurors were able to handle

91. J-L.J, supra note 54 at para. 33.
92. Daubert v.Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
93. B6land, supra note 46 at para. 19.
94. Greely & Illes, supra note 17.
95. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
96. Scheffer supra note 62.
97. Ibid. at 309-312. This lack of reliability was the common ground of justification for rejecting
polygraph evidence for eight of the nine judges. One of the nine judges dissented, arguing that
polygraph testing was reliable enough to survive a perse ban on admissibility.
98. lbid. at 312-315. Collateral issues might include things such as the qualifications ofthe polygraph
examiner or whether the test and control questions were appropriate.
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the polygraph evidence and that the majority's concerns demeaned their
competence. 99
It is quite interesting that five of the nine judges in Scheffer were
unconcerned with the kinds of concerns that swayed the majority in Bdland
The concerns of the Bland majority were couched in the language of
evidence law and exclusionary rules but fundamentally had to do with (1)
a firm commitment to the idea that credibility determination is a matter
for human triers of fact and that technological assistance ought not to be
permitted to displace the trier of the fact, (2) a concern that polygraph
evidence would raise confusing and distracting side-issues that would
consume judicial resources for no good purpose, and (3) a doubt about
reliability as manifested in the idea that an accused could retake the test
as many times as needed to get a favourable result. It is unclear how the
Bilandjudges would have ruled had they been given sufficient evidence
on reliability to be able to reject the polygraph on that basis. Perhaps the
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada too, like the majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court, would have preferred to rule solely on the basis of
reliability.
In any event, in these two cases, we see energetic criticisms from
a minority of judges in Bdland and a majority of judges in Scheffer of
the reasoning that the polygraph must be rejected because judgments of
credibility must be preserved as a core function of human triers of fact
and that the triers of fact are likely to be overawed by the "mystique of
science."100 The point for the purposes of the present argument is that
while reliability appears to be a solid reason for rejecting the polygraph,
these other arguments about dehumanization and the traditional purview
of the trier of fact are much less solid. This story is also demonstrated in a
different context in the history of how DNA evidence came to be accepted
in the courts.
2. DNA evidence
The recent history of the reception of DNA evidence provides another
example of the incorporation of novel scientific evidence into judicial
procedures. A possible preliminary objection is that DNA evidence
offers an imperfect model to use in predicting the courts' reactions to
neuroscientific lie detection because there are goodreasons to expect that
courts will have different reactions to the two technologies. DNA evidence
is used for identification rather than for credibility determination. Since

99. Ibid. at 318-319.
100. Ibid; Bdland, supra note 46 at para. 39.
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the courts are used to accepting the help of witnesses (including expert
witnesses such as fingerprint experts) with identification, the reflex to
reject technological evidence as invading the province of the trier of fact
is not present with DNA as it appears to be with lie detection technologies.
Despite this objection, I think the example of DNA evidence is still useful.
It demonstrates the power of reliability to overcome objections about
dehumanization and the "mystique of science," which have also been
raised against the polygraph and, it seems likely, would be raised against
neuroscientific lie detection.
DNA evidence is based on a match between the accused's DNA and
that found at the scene of the crime and an estimated likelihood that such
a match might occur randomly. The estimate is essential in assessing the
significance of the match in DNA sequences. DNA evidence was first
introduced in Canada in the late 1980s, and the probability estimates
were soon challenged on the basis of accuracy and on the basis of the
effect of the "mystic infallibility" of science on the jury."' The fear that
juries would be overwhelmed by the statistics led courts to refuse to admit
numerical statements about the likelihood of random matches (although
phrases such as "rare" were allowed).102 As one court put it,
There is a real danger that the jury will use the evidence as a measure
of the probability of the accused's guilt or innocence and thereby
undermine the presumption of innocence and erode the value served by
the reasonable doubt standard. As said in the Schwartz case: "[it would]
dehumanize our justice system." 03
The refusal to admit numerical statistics began to waver in the 1990s and,
in 1997, one trial judge stated that "if the jury is denied the statistics, they
would be denied part of the DNA evidence."' 04 In the 1997 case of R. v.
Terceirathe Ontario Court ofAppeal considered the concern that the jurors
would be overcome by the "mystic infallibility" of DNA evidence. 0 The
Court rejected the idea of using terms such as "rare, unlikely and remote"
instead of the statistical numbers because these terms were "awkward"
and unable "to convey the potency of a match."' 06

101. Trevor R. McDonald, "Genetic Justice: DNA Evidence and the Criminal Law in Canada" (1998)
26 Man. L. J. 1; Neil Gerlach, The Genetic Imaginary. DNA in the Canadian Criminal Justice System
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) at 41-43 [Gerlach].
102. Bourguignon, supra note 3.
103. Ibid
104. R. v. Henson [1997] O.J. No. 5585 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 39.
105. Terceira, supra note 56 at para. 55.
106. Ibid. at para. 58.
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The strong language about dehumanization that is used in Bourguignon
suggests that a deeper objection was at work beyond the concern that the jury
would be unduly deferential to the DNA evidence. In that case, the Court
quoted from a U.S. case which in turn drew the idea of dehumanization of
the justice system from Laurence Tribe's article "Trial by Mathematics."' 0 '
Tribe suggests that "much of the contemporary opposition to the
technological emphasis upon rationality and technique" rests on the idea
that it is "dehumanizing" to talk in highly abstract or quantitative terms
about certain subjects such as justice.'s On the other hand, Tribe suggests
that mathematical tools are attractive because of "the lure of objectivity
and precision."' 09 Tribe's language echoes that of Jacques Ellul, in his
sociological study of technology."o Ellul predicted that the technological
mindset would ensure that the values of rationality and efficiency would
necessarily overcome any competing attachment to customary values.
In his article, Tribe argues that the lawsuit is not just about a search for
historical truth, but it is also, and in his view, equally importantly, a ritual
of conflict settlement."' He views the admittedly flawed human elements
of the ritual as essential and argues that they are preferable to the alienating
and intimidating prospect of an inscrutable "trial by mathematics."I12
Tribe's plea can be understood as a plea that is essentially the same as that
ofjudges defending against the "dehumanization" of the justice system by
the polygraph machine or by DNA technology.
The DNA cases show how quickly this type of concern about the
dehumanization of the justice system can evaporate. Put another way, they
illustrate how quickly we become habituated to the latest technological
tool. Over fewer than ten years, DNA technology and its associated
statistical analysis moved from being a form of evidence that would
"dehumanize the justice system" to a tool that must be embraced because
of the "potency of a match."
Part of the reason for this rapid shift may be that DNA technology
quickly acquired the power to challenge the legitimacy of the justice
system. Once DNA came to be accepted as a highly accurate and precise
identification technology, it was available to challenge prior convictions

107. Laurence Tribe, "Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process" (1971) 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1329 [Tribe].
108. Ibid at 1331.
109. Ibid. at 1331-1332.
110. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, (trans. by John Wilkinson) (New York: Vintage,
1964).
111. Tribe, supranote 107 at 1376.
112. Ibid. at 1376-1377.
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in a way that would be intolerable for the continued credibility of the
justice system. How could convictions stand where widely-trusted DNA
evidence exonerated the convicted prisoner? Speaking about a high profile
Canadian wrongful conviction case, Gerlach writes that,
[t]he press coverage ... brought DNA testing into the Morin narrative

as a heroic ultimate identifier - an objective truth teller that cut through
the inefficient and ineffective rituals of testimony, witnessing, and
organizational process to reveal the truth...DNA tests were being
presented as a liberating factor and their accuracy as unquestionable - as
the objective remedy to the subjective biases of the system."'
Gerlach quotes Guy Paul Morin as saying "[t]he justice system failed me,
but science saved me.. .My lawyers did the best they could through the
avenues of the justice system. But in the end, science gave the final word.
Science is wonderful. I love science."ll 4
This pattern of initial suspicion and resistance, framed as a concern
about the "mystic infallibility" or "mystique" of science, or as concern
about the dehumanization of justice is thus demonstrated both in the
context of DNA evidence as well as with lie detection technologies. The
majority decision in BdIand justified the rejection of polygraph evidence
in part on the risk that the trier of fact would be overawed by the "mystique
of science.""' However, this view is fragile and apt to ebb away with time.
The minority in Bland rejected this concern, suggesting that juries "are
not today in awe of scientific evidence as they might have been a hundred
or even fifty years ago""l6 and would be able to consider polygraph
evidence along with all the other evidence in determining credibility. The
Scheffer court suggested that the "fear that the average jury is not able to
assess the weight of [the polygraph testimony] reflects a distressing lack of
confidence in the intelligence of the average American.""'
The history of the DNA cases and of the polygraph cases mentioned
above illustrate that an evidentiary exclusion justified on the basis that
the public will be overwhelmed by novel science is quite fragile. The
integration of novel science and technology into the culture is a function
of its efficiency and reliability, and it seems that the justice system is
no exception to this rule despite an almost romantic attachment to the
customary non-technological methods of judicial fact-finding.
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Where a form of evidence is widely accepted as nearly infallible, as
DNA evidence has become, it acquires the power to call the legal system
"wrong" in its judgments. The continued legitimacy and credibility of
the justice system therefore requires that the new form of evidence be
incorporated. One of the mechanisms by which the legal system is
structured to ensure that this happens is through the constitutional right to
make full answer and defence, as will now be discussed.
3. Constitutionalrights and the right "to make full answer and
defence"
Another important legal matter that will arise if a court refuses an accused's
request to admit evidence from a lie detection technology is the issue of
the constitutional right to make full answer and defence. This right was
raised by dissenting judges in the Canadian and U.S. Supreme Court
cases dealing with the polygraph, and is likely to be raised in the case of
neuroscientific lie detection."'
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the right to make full answer
and defense is protected by the CanadianCharterofRights andFreedoms." 9
As a general proposition, all probative evidence is admissible unless there
is a clear ground of policy or law that justifies its exclusion.' 2 0 One of the
policy reasons to exclude evidence is that its probative value is outweighed
by its prejudicial effects on the trial (e.g., that the evidence may unduly
arouse a jury's emotions of hostility or sympathy, or that it might consume
an undue amount of time, etc.). 2 1 The effect of the Charteris to place a
thumb on the scale in favour of the accused in this contest between probative
value and prejudicial effect. While the standard for excluding prosecution
evidence is whether the prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, the
Chartercases make it clear that in order to exclude defense evidence, the
prejudice must "substantially outweigh" 22 the probative value. This is not
a very satisfying legal test, since the meaning of "substantially outweigh"
leaves much room for discretion, but it is clear that the threshold for the
exclusion of defense evidence will be fairly high. The Canadian Supreme

118. Ibid. at 320-321; Beand, supra note 46 at para. 30.
119. R. v. Rose, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262 at para. 97.
120. R. v. Seaboyer [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 at para. 37.
121. Ibid at para. 40.
122. The Supreme Court of Canada wrote in R. v. Seaboyer (ibid. at para. 43) that "Canadian courts,
like courts in most common law jurisdictions, have been extremely cautious in restricting the power of
the accused to call evidence in his or her defence, a reluctance founded in the fundamental tenet of our
judicial system that an innocent person must not be convicted. It follows from this that the prejudice
must substantially outweigh the value of the evidence before a judge can exclude evidence relevant to
a defence allowed by law."
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Court has said that relevant and reliable evidence will only infrequently be
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.'23
If neuroscientific lie detection technologies develop to the point
where they are highly reliable and thus highly probative, it is difficult to
imagine that the prejudicial effects they are said to cause will be able to
justify the exclusion of this evidence. The argument that this technology
will overawe the trier of fact and/or dehumanize the justice system is
unlikely to be convincing against exculpatory evidence that is accepted as
reliable, as occurred in the DNA context. The argument that this evidence
would, create distracting side-issues and lead to the undue consumption
of time also sounds extremely hollow against exculpatory evidence that
is-considered highly reliable. It is a poor argument against very helpful
evidence that it will take up too much time.
Conclusion
The key determinant of whether courts are likely to accept neuroscientific
lie detection is the degree to which this evidence is shown to be reliable.
To some, this may sound like a fine result, and one unworthy of concern or
comment. However, this paper has sought to demonstrate that the courts
have cultural attachments to a traditional non-technological manner of
doing justice. The repeated references to the "dehumanization" of the
justice system in the context of DNA and polygraph evidence illustrate
this point. The theory of the autonomy of technology predicts, however,
that such customs and traditions will give way to the adoption of novel
technologies that are efficient and effective. This may be the right result,
and, from the perspective of an accused person, the risk of an unfair
conviction is a high price to pay to preserve a cultural attachment to a
customary low-technology and fallible method of doing justice. On the
other hand, it is possible that these cultural traditions also have some
value.
In my view, these cultural attachments to credibility determination by
human triers of fact are unlikely to be able to withstand the pressure to
adopt reliable neuroscientific lie detection. This is because technologies
that are widely accepted as reliable cannot be permitted to remain outside
the justice system to deliver their own verdicts incompatible with those of
the courts. The continued legitimacy of the justice system cannot tolerate
this. The rules of evidence and, in particular, the constitutional guarantee
of the right to make full answer and defense provide the legal mechanisms
by which this accommodation would take place.

123. Ibid. at para. 44.
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For now, the aspirations of neuroscientific lie detection are too modest
to replace human beings in the courtroom. They do not currently pass
the legal threshold of reliability. Furthermore, even if they do attain a
sufficient degree of reliability in detecting advertent deception, they may
still be unable to detect failures of memory or perception or those who have
convinced themselves of their own lies. Who knows, however, where the
technology will go in the future?

